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Commentary on Heinz Richter, 'Operation Mercury, the Invasion 
of Crete' 
 
DAVID FILER 
 
The battle of Crete, fought in May-June 1941, remains a significant event in New Zealand’s 
history. New Zealand soldiers played a crucial role in the fighting and their casualty rate, 
with over 3,800 dead, wounded and prisoners of war, was high for such a small country. Kiwi 
commanders made key decisions in the battle, decisions which led directly to the Allied 
defeat. Which commanders and which decisions, however, has been a subject of debate ever 
since. 
 
Heinz Richter’s article on the battle has interest for a New Zealand audience because it 
presents an often unheard German view. Richter provides a useful analysis of the German 
problems in assembling their invasion force, in reconnaissance over Crete and in sticking to 
schedule with their transport planes on the day of the assault. All of these matters increased 
the possibility of a German defeat. Furthermore, his interpretation of the decision-making by 
commanders in Athens and on Crete adds to our understanding of the plans for the invasion 
and the progress of the battle. He points out that German ‘mission-style tactics’ meant that 
their officers on Crete were better able than their Allied counterparts to make immediate 
decisions in the heat of battle without waiting for orders from above. 
 
Richter also adds to our limited awareness of the ‘rather neglected role of the Greeks’ in the 
battle. He shows that the gendarmes and other Greek forces played a more important part 
than most New Zealand historians have acknowledged. 
 
However, it is clear that he has not looked at the original New Zealand documents on the 
battle, now held in Archives New Zealand. Because of this, he has relied on the 
interpretations of British authors (in particular the prominent military historian, Antony 
Beevor) about the decisions made by Kiwi commanders on Crete. The documents in New 
Zealand show that in a number of areas these views are wrong. 
 
Richter (and Beevor and others) appear to not understand that General Freyberg’s defence 
plan was based on immediate counter-attack to push the German forces off any foothold they 
were able to gain.1 This policy was successfully put into practice at Irakleion (Heraklion), 
Rethymon (Retimo), Suda Bay and Chania (Hania). It did not occur at the key airfield at 
Maleme because the New Zealand brigade commander was almost certainly having another 
attack of the shell shock from which he had suffered intermittently since World War I.2 A 
counter-attack at Maleme on the first day would probably have defeated the depleted German 
forces west of the airfield, as General Student acknowledged after the war.3 Such a success 
would have led to the Allies winning the entire battle.  
 
Nor does Richter realise that Freyberg, while concerned about a sea invasion, was well aware 
that the primary threat was from the airborne forces attempting to seize an airfield. His 
headquarter’s summary of the German plan of attack, issued to senior commanders on 12 
May, stated that ‘the entire plan is based on the capture of the aerodromes’ and that sea 
landings ‘will be of secondary importance to those from the air’.4 Richter also says that the 
only place where the parachutists had a chance to take an airfield was at Maleme, when in 
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fact they came close to seizing the airfield at Retimo and were thrown back only after a series 
of determined counter-attacks by the Australian and Greek defenders. 
 
Richter repeats earlier criticisms of Freyberg for keeping Allied forces in defensive positions 
on the beaches rather than committing them to a counter-attack at Maleme on the second 
night of the battle. However, two German flotillas were approaching Crete that night and, if 
they were not intercepted by the Royal Navy, the Allies would have had to confront them 
once they had reached the coast. Fortunately for the defenders, the RN did its job but 
Freyberg could not be sure of this in advance.  
 
These military history debates aside, Richter’s most controversial views concern war crimes 
committed during and immediately after the battle. He mentions only two acts of terror 
against Cretan civilians by German paratroopers and soldiers, whereas at least nine villages 
suffered punitive operations between June and August 1941, with hundreds of Cretans shot. 
He also fails to acknowledge that some of these atrocities were a direct result of General 
Student’s order of May 31 for harsh reprisals against any civilians who had fought against the 
invaders.5  
 
Richter attempts to exonerate Student by mentioning both the support a Kiwi officer gave 
him at his war crimes trial after the war and the friendly relations later established between 
the New Zealand Crete Veterans Association and the paratroop veterans association. It is, 
however, unlikely that either of these events would have happened if the Kiwis had been 
aware of Student’s reprisal order on Crete and the subsequent atrocities committed by some 
of the paratroopers. 
 
Richter also states, on the basis of post-battle reports by German combatants, that ‘the Maoris 
did not always observe the rules of war’ during the battle. It is true that New Zealand soldiers 
were involved in more close quarter fighting and bayonet charges on Crete than in any other 
battle during the war. By their nature, such actions are savage and merciless. For instance, in 
the fight at ‘42nd Street’ on May 27, Maori (and other New Zealand and Australian soldiers) 
killed many Germans who were attempting to flee or take shelter from a fierce bayonet 
charge. However, there is no reason to assume that this or other similar events involved 
deliberate war crimes and there is no New Zealand evidence suggesting that Maori soldiers 
on Crete failed to observe the rules of war. 
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